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China as a WTO developing member, 
is it a problem? 
Weinian Hu 
 
Abstract 
The developing member status is an area identified for WTO reform by the US, the EU and the Trilateral 
Trade Ministerial Cooperation. The grievance is that some of the world’s top trading nations that 
declared themselves as developing members are taking advantage of the 155 special and deferential 
treatment provisions embedded to date across the range of WTO agreements, resorting to weaker 
commitments, undermining the functioning of the multilateral trading system and impeding the 
negotiation of future agreements.  
The developing member status per se is not a problem in relation to China’s commitments undertaken 
at its WTO accession, neither following accession as far as the three agreements that China participated 
in are concerned. China relinquished most special and differential treatment provisions at its accession, 
and many of its commitments are WTO-plus in nature. Within this remit, the problem lies in China’s lack 
of faithful compliance with certain accession commitments, such as notification and transparency. 
However, China’s developing member status could be a problem for the ongoing fisheries subsidies 
negotiations, especially given its world-leading fishing capacity. This presumption could also be true for 
other negotiations, for example those regarding the joint initiative on the trade-related aspects of e-
commerce.  
China’s persistent claim of developing member status at the WTO may be understood as a result of 
political positioning, too, because championing “South-South cooperation” is a strategic priority for 
China’s diplomacy.   
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hina’s WTO developing member status has long been a subject for debate, and even 
more so recently amidst the reform calls for enhanced WTO disciplines with regard to, 
for example, the notification and transparency obligations within the remit of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). Closer inspection shows that 
the developing member status per se may not have practical implications regarding those 
commitments that China pledged at its WTO accession, nor to the three agreements it has 
participated in since accession. This is because China did not accede to the WTO as a developing 
country and, following accession, appeared not to opt for less or weaker commitments by 
taking advantage of the special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions that the three 
relevant agreements afford to WTO developing members.  
In this context, faithful implementation of outstanding WTO commitments, such as notification, 
would be much more important than the developing status of China. This proposition is equally 
applicable to the ongoing fisheries subsidies agreement negotiations with regard to the 
negotiation objective of “precise reporting” (of fisheries subsidies). But there is more. From the 
onset, China’s developing member claim is challenged due to its high fishing capacity, and is 
therefore regarded as a developed country. China’s disputed developing member status and 
its position of asserting “development interests for developing countries” in trade negotiations 
will impact on the conclusion of the fisheries subsidies agreement, and most possibly on other 
future agreements. Therefore, the present call for reforming the WTO developing member 
status is valid. 
One chief motive for questioning China’s WTO developing member claim is the suspicion that 
the country has been resorting to weaker commitments by taking advantage of the so far 155 
SDT provisions1 embedded across the range of WTO agreements, and therefore, allegedly, 
undermines the functioning of the multilateral trading system. It came as no surprise that WTO 
developing member status is identified as an area where the WTO’s rules-making capacity 
requires enhancement, according to the Commission’s Concept Paper on WTO Modernisation 
published in September 2018. The EU-Japan-US Trilateral Trade Ministerial Cooperation 
(hereunder the Trilateral Cooperation) equally sees the imperative to reform the SDT 
mechanism in current and future WTO negotiations, and calls on “advanced WTO members” 
 
1 The SDT itself has attracted many doubts over the decades since the Uruguay round often on the actual benefits 
accrued from the SDT for WTO developing members for integration into the multilateral trading system. 
Therefore, there have been calls to reform the SDT mechanism to make its provisions more precise, effective and 
operational. See Ademola Oyejide T., Special and Differential Treatment, in Hoekman B. et al (ed.) Development, 
Trade and the WTO, A Handbook, the World Bank, Washington DC (2002), at pp.504-8. See also 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/sdt_e.htm (last accessed 30 September 2019).  
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to make full commitments in ongoing and future WTO negotiations. The dynamics of this 
discussion are also on full display at the WTO General Council.2  
This research report underlines the fact that the commitments China made at its WTO 
accession are specific, and were not negotiated with regard to the country’s developing 
member claim but the “special and unusual characteristics of the Chinese economy” and its 
market size. As a result, and especially during the bilateral negotiations conducted with the 
United States and the EU, China conceded to relinquish most SDT provisions and made many 
pledges that are WTO-plus in nature. Therefore, China’s persistent developing member claim 
is in reality less relevant to its WTO accession obligations, nor even to the two multilateral 
protocols and one plurilateral agreement that it signed up to post-accession. The country did 
opt into a number of SDTs, but they are often related to procedure, such as the right to review 
a countervailing measure, rather than representing a weaker commitment, so their significance 
is negligible.   
At the same time, China has yet to implement faithfully some of the more significant WTO 
accession commitments, including those related to operations of state-owned enterprise 
(SOEs) and subsidy notification obligations, including fisheries subsidies notification. Indeed, 
those are the same WTO reform areas identified by the EU and the Trilateral Cooperation 
because the present disciplines, as they argue, are either not effective enough for enforcement 
or not updated in order to capture and rectify the distorting trade practices or policies. 
Nonetheless, due to the constraints of the consensus-based WTO rules-making procedure, the 
efforts for reform spearheaded by the EU and the Trilateral Cooperation may become 
redundant if China’s participation is absent. The same outcome will likely occur when a 
plurilateral arrangement is sought in order to effect any WTO rule-changes. Having said that, 
to participate or not to participate in the EU-led or the Trilateral-led reform initiative is not a 
question for China. After all, the country has its own WTO reform proposal that aims to achieve 
development interests for developing countries.3 The overriding question for China is of 
 
2 See Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements,  
JOB/GC/204/Rev.2, JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2, 27 June 2019; An Inclusive Approach to Transparency and Notification 
Requirements in the WTO, JOB/GC/218, JOB/CTG/15 JOB/SERV/292, JOB/IP/33 JOB/DEV/58, JOB/AG/158, 27 June 
2019; the Continued Relevance of Special and Differential Treatment in Favour of Developing Members to 
Promote Development and Ensure Inclusiveness, WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2, 26 February 2019; Pursuing the 
Development Dimension in WTO Rule-making Efforts, WT/GC/W/770/Rev.2, 6 May 2019; Strengthening the WTO 
to Promote Development and Inclusivity, WT/GC/W/778/Rev.1, 22 July 2019. Moreover, in July 2019 the USTR 
was tasked to use all available means to secure changes in the WTO to prevent unqualified developing countries 
from taking advantage of WTO rules and negotiations. China is highlighted as an illustration. See President Trump’s 
Memo dated 26 July 2019, which points out that, among others, nearly two-thirds of WTO members, including 
some of the world’s wealthiest economies, claim developing member status. Consequently, the Memo alleged 
that such members make weaker commitments, and this harms not only other developed economies but also 
economies that truly require special and differential treatment. China is singled out as the country that “most 
dramatically illustrates the point”. See Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World Trade 
Organization, Presidential Memoranda, 26 July 2019.   
3 See China’s proposal on WTO reform published in May 2019. Among others, it pleads for safeguarding the 
development interests of developing members, particularly in the areas of agriculture, trade remedy rules, 
fisheries subsidies, e-commerce and new issues, such as investment facilitation. 
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faithfully implementing its outstanding WTO commitments, which are in essence a contractual 
duty that the country has yet to fulfil.    
This report will first examine how SDT provisions may be enjoyed by developing members, 
when different forms of obligations must be respected at the same time. Applying the two 
above-mentioned considerations on which China’s WTO accession negotiations were based, it 
will then emphasise a number of more significant Chinese commitments, including those on 
notification. It will also demonstrate that China did not take advantage of its developing 
member status when participating in the three agreements following accession. Since China’s 
claim of developing member status is in dispute with regard to the fisheries subsidies 
agreement negotiation, the report will lay out the controversies in this regard and this, 
consequently, leads to a brief case study of the country’s weak enforcement in subsidies 
notification obligations. Before concluding, the report suggests a way forward for enhanced 
notification.  
1. SDT provisions and how they may be enjoyed by developing members 
There are no definitions of “developed” and “developing” members within the context of the 
WTO. Ordinarily, members announce for themselves whether they are “developed” or 
“developing”,4 though other members can challenge the decision of a member that makes use 
of SDT provisions available to developing members, a category which also includes least 
developed countries (LDC).5 
The WTO developing member status affords certain SDT privileges, e.g. a longer transitional 
period before implementing an agreement, or a temporary use of a policy instrument with a 
view to fully implementing an agreement and integrating the multilateral trading system. 
Therefore, the SDT mechanism, also known as flexibility, is designed to accomplish two 
objectives: (a) to enhance market access conditions in the face of the divergent interests and 
priorities between developing and developed beneficiary members, and (b) to exempt 
developing members from certain multilateral trade disciplines and thus offer them some 
 
4 Singapore argued that it is a small economy with no natural resources and a high reliance on global trade, 
therefore it is a WTO developing member. See Chan C., Singapore Supports Update of WTO Rules, Will Not Use 
Special Provisions for Developing Nations, Channel News Asia, 19 September 2019. Available at: 
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-supports-update-of-wto-rules-developing-
country-status-11918958 (last accessed 22 August 2019). Indeed, queries will arise when Singapore is heard 
claiming a WTO developing member. Singapore’s GDP per capita reached $64,581.944 in 2018, that was 30% 
higher than the average GDP per capita of a high-income country which stood at $44,705.873. Available 
at:https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=SG-XD (last accessed 28 July 2019).  
Having said that, Zhang Xiangchen et al provided a rundown of different theories, such as ‘poverty as capability 
deprivation’ advocated by Amartya Sen, based on which a country may be qualified as developing country. See 
Zhang X., Xu Q. & Wang J., Capacity Constraint: A Fundamental Perspective for the Development Issue at WTO, 
Journal of World Trade 53, no. 1 (2019): 1–38.  
5 Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last accessed 21 July 2019).  
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flexibility in the use of various trade and trade-related measures.6 Developing members can 
receive technical assistance, too.7 However, the status does not automatically qualify a 
developing member, self-declared or not, an access to all SDT provisions. Consequently, the 
use of SDTs is defined by obligations, usually in the forms of time limits and thresholds. 
The manner in which a developing member may benefit from an SDT provision depends, in the 
first place, on how its WTO accession is negotiated and certainly the status quo of its trade 
practices at the time of accession. For example, the SDTs provided by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) were less relevant to China 
at its accession. In this regard, patent rights protection is a case in point. China already 
incorporated all the main ingredients prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement in its domestic patent 
legislation in 1992, nine years ahead of its WTO accession. This includes the 20-year protection 
term for invention patents, and the expanded scope of patentable subject matters to include 
pharmaceutical, agricultural chemical process and products, etc.8 The Chinese legislature 
amended the Patent Law in 1992 in order to implement the provisions concluded under the 
Sino-US MOU on the Protection of Intellectual Property, signed in the same year.9    
Apart from negotiations, a developing member may also choose to opt in or out of the SDTs 
provided by a specific WTO agreement. China opted out of the eight-year transitional period 
that the ASCM offers to developing members as will be elaborated below. China also opted out 
from the flexibilities provided by the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)10 as far as 
implementation is concerned. China implemented 94.5% of all the provisions by the time the 
Agreement entered into force on 22 February 2017; a further 4.5% of the provisions were 
implemented after a transitional period of one year. Three more provisions still require 
implementation and China has notified the TFA Council that by 22 February 2020 they will all 
be implemented.   
Moreover, the SDT does not automatically provide blanket coverage to all self-claimed 
developing members. Some SDTs are only available to a limited number of specified developing 
members. Within this context, even when a developing member is eligible to enjoy certain 
SDTs, that privilege often comes with obligations, which is anyway often the case when an SDT 
is applied. For example, the ASCM acknowledges that subsidy could be a policy instrument for 
development for certain developing members. But when reading Article 27.2(a) and Annex VII 
of the ASCM together, only 21 specified developing members are qualified to enjoy this 
 
6 See Ademola Oyejide T., Special and Differential Treatment, in Hoekman B. et al (ed.) Development, Trade and 
the WTO, A Handbook, the World Bank, Washington DC (2002), at pp. 504-8. 
7 Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm#legal_ 
provisions (last accessed 28 July 2019). 
8 For the evolution of patent legislation in China, see Hu W., International Patent Rights Protection – the Case of 
China, Routledge, 2017, at pp.122-36.   
9 Article 1 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the United States of America on the Protection of Intellectual Property, 1992.  
10 SDT measures provided by the TFA cover flexibilities of commitments, of action, and use of policy instruments, 
transitional time periods, technical assistance and special provisions relating to LDCs. 
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privilege for the purpose of export performance,11 within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the 
ASCM. With a more generous coverage, Article 27.2(b) of the ASCM provides developing 
members a transitional period of eight years to implement Article 3.1(a) of the Agreement. If 
qualified to apply this flexibility, the modes of application must be, nonetheless, consistent with 
Article 27(4) of the ASCM. As a result, qualified developing members are required not to 
increase the level of subsidies for export performance, and should eliminate them sooner if the 
use of such subsidies for export performance is inconsistent with their development needs. 
Apart from that, all members must comply with the prohibitions of subsidies for the purpose 
of export performance as prescribed by Article 3.1(a), as illustrated by Annex I, of the ASCM. 
Still, this privilege is applicable only if it is admitted into a member’s accession agreement after 
negotiations. In other words, if a member fails to claim it, then this provision will not be 
applicable to the member concerned.  
As far as the obligations attached to the various SDTs are concerned, in the event of a breach 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will decide on sanctions as the ‘mailbox case’ 
illustrates. The TRIPS Agreement provides a five-year transitional period for developing 
members.12 Article 65.4 of the Agreement further prescribes that a developing member may 
delay in providing patent protection to a product for an additional five years if the area of 
technology of that product in question is not protected in its territory on the date of its WTO 
accession. As a WTO developing member, India claimed both privileges successfully. 
Nonetheless, before India was able to apply Article 65.4 to delay providing patent rights 
protection to pharmaceutical products, the country was obliged to institute a ‘mailbox’ facility 
for those patent applications for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products that were 
submitted to Indian patent authorities in the intervening years.13 Moreover, such a facility must 
not be instituted merely based on administrative practice by virtue of Article 70(8)(a), which 
was confirmed pursuant to the decision laid down by the DSB in the case India – Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (DS50). On top of that, by 
virtue of Article 70(9) of the TRIPS Agreement, during the transitional period when a patent 
application was submitted for one of the above-mentioned products, India was compelled to 
grant five-year exclusive marketing rights to the product concerned on the condition that it had 
already obtained a patent granted by another member of the TRIPS Agreement. The DSB 
decided against India when it failed its obligations with regard to the ‘mailbox’ facility as well 
as the “exclusive marketing rights”, after America lodged a complaint.    
 
11 The group of specific developing members consist of 1) LDCs designated as such by the United Nations that are 
members of the WTO; 2) Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka 
and Zimbabwe, and each of them is subject to the provisions applicable to other developing country members 
according to Article 27.2(b) when GNP per capita has reached $1,000 per annum. 
12 Article 65 (1)(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
13 The ‘mailbox’ facility is an arrangement by which patent applications of pharmaceutical, agricultural chemical 
products were accepted, the respective filing date was assigned, but without the need to process these 
applications until the transitional period was due in 2005. For detailed discussion on the ‘mailbox’ facility, see Hu 
W., International Patent Rights Protection – the Case of China, Routledge, 2017, at pp.156-7. 
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Similarly, in the case China — Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers (DS511), the 
Appellate Body found that the country’s specific domestic support was inconsistent with its 
obligations under Articles 3.2 and 6.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) for breaching the 
rule of de minimis, China conceded to the findings and pledged to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB.14  
On the other hand, currently many SDT provisions are ‘best endeavour’ type of clauses that 
lack precision, operationality and enforceability,15 so their actual impact on a member’s 
(weaker) commitment may therefore not be attainable after all. Quite possibly, also in addition, 
some developing members do not necessarily have the intention of claiming any SDT benefits, 
although they declared the developing status. For example, Singapore, as one of the richest 
nations in the world by GDP per capita, has made it clear that it will not seek special provisions 
in negotiations under its developing member status in the WTO.16 Therefore, the developing 
status per se may not be an enabler for SDT flexibilities, while much is determined at the 
member’s WTO accession negotiations, which is the case of China. 
2. China’s WTO commitments  
2.1 At accession 
China did not accede to the WTO as a developing country. Its lower-middle income level in 
2001,17 which should have qualified the country as a WTO developing member was ignored, 
and the accession was negotiated on the basis of the “special and unusual characteristics of the 
Chinese economy” and its market size,18 as the US professed. Consequently, the series of WTO-
plus commitments that China concluded with the US and the EU in their respective bilateral 
 
14 Subsequently, China and the US reached an agreement to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings 
by 31 March 2020. See China – Domestic support for agricultural producers (DS511).  
15 See the Communication of the Continued Relevance of Special and Differential Treatment in Favour of 
Developing Members to Promote Development and Ensure Inclusiveness, WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2, 4 March 2019. 
This communication, dated 26 February 2019, is being circulated at the request of the delegations of China, India, 
South Africa, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Kenya, Cuba, Central African Republic and Pakistan. 
16 See Singapore supports update of WTO rules, will not use special provisions for developing nations: Chan Chun 
Sing, Channel News Asia, 18 September 2018 https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-
supports-update-of-wto-rules-developing-country-status-11918958 (last accessed 22 September 2019).  
17 China’s GDP per capita was $1,053.108 in 2001, which was below the average in middle income countries 
($1,272.598) but above the average in lower middle-income countries ($564.122). https://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN-XN (last accessed 29 July 2019).    
18 These characteristics include the high degree of state participation in the Chinese economy; a series of industrial 
policy measures intended to draw jobs and technology to China, such as local content, offset and export 
performance requirements as well as forced technology transfer, dumping, etc. See Statement of Ambassador 
Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, on Accession of China to the WTO, hearing before the 
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 3 May 2000.  
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accession agreement were incorporated into China’s WTO accession package.19 The 
concessions that China made are wide-ranging and encompass not only areas in trade and 
investment, but also in the organisation and functioning of the country’s judiciary and 
administration, which was unprecedented at the WTO.20  
Indeed, the terms for China’s WTO accession are China-specific and demanding. China pledged 
to eliminate all subsidy programmes within the meaning of Article 3 of the ASCM – for the 
purposes of export performance or for the use of domestic over imported goods – immediately, 
upon accession, in accordance with Paragraph 10.3 of its WTO Protocol of Accession. As to 
agricultural export subsidies, China pledged to eliminate and not to introduce them pursuant 
to the conclusion of the US-China Bilateral WTO Agreement, in November 1999. Based on the 
same bilateral agreement, Article 15(a) of China’s Accession Protocol prescribes a 15-year 
period for price compatibility when determining dumping margins and, in the meantime, 
China’s special economic characteristics, whether a market economy or not, must be taken into 
account when identifying and measuring subsidy benefits if any. This provision incorporated 
the guarantee that America had struck with China for continuing using the “non-market 
economy” methodology applied in anti-dumping cases when calculating dumping margins for 
the same period of 15 years.21   
Also, following the agricultural domestic subsidy case mentioned before, in relation to the de 
minimis threshold applied when calculating a member’s current AMS (Aggregate Measurement 
of Support) within the meaning of Article 6.4 of the AoA on domestic support commitments, 
China pledged 8.5% for both product-specific and non-product-specific support of the total 
value of production of a basic agricultural product during the relevant year.22 This is lower than 
the 10% exemption applied to developing members, and higher than the 5% for developed 
members.23 It should be noted that AMS is an area where China seeks redress in its WTO reform 
proposal dated 13 May 2019. The country found “significant inequity, imbalance and 
unfairness persist in current rules on agriculture” because, as it observed, some developed 
members enjoy high levels of AMS and therefore are able to surpass the 5% de minimis 
threshold to provide domestic support to a number of specific products, while the majority of 
developing members have no entitlement to AMS. Furthermore, some developing members 
 
19 For a detailed explanation on the WTO accession process, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
acc_e/acc_e.htm (last accessed 29 July 2019). Note that the accession procedures are outlined in document 
WT/ACC/22/Rev.1, as a practical, non-binding guide. 
20 For details of China’s WTO-plus accession obligations, see Qin J. ‘WTO-plus’ obligations and their implications 
for the World Trade Organization system – an appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, Journal of World Trade 
37 (3): 483-522, 2003. 
21 See Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, on Accession of China 
to the WTO, hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 3 May 2000. 
22 See Paragraph 235 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 1 October 2001, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49. 
23 Article 6.4, WTO Agreement on Agriculture. 
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could not implement domestic public stockholding programmes necessary for food security 
purposes.24  
Within the context of the ASCM, other major commitments to which China conceded at its 
accession included relinquishing a transitional period and arrangements as provided by Article 
27 of the ASCM and under which, for example, a developing member may use subsidies as a 
policy instrument for export performance purposes for a period of eight years within the 
meaning of Article 3.1(a) as mentioned above.   
China did opt in to some SDTs at its accession. For example, China opted into Article 27.10-12 
and 27.15 of the ASCM.25 The former governs determination of de minimis within the remit 
of Article 15.3 with regard to injury caused by subsidised imports, while Article 27.15 retains a 
developing member’s right to request to review a countervailing measure in order to examine 
whether it is consistent with the provisions of Articles 27.10-11 of the ASCM. Those opt-ins 
concern procedures, and are not about lesser commitment; therefore, their significance is 
nearly negligible.  
2.2 After WTO accession  
After acceding to the WTO in 2001, China accepted two multilateral instruments, namely, the 
2005 protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement and the 2014 protocol concerning the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement (TFA). China is also a participant in the expanded version of the 
plurilateral Information Technology Agreement (ITA) concluded in December 2015. China has 
so far not used the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement. The country opted out from the 
flexibilities afforded to developing members by the other two agreements, respectively.   
On grounds of public health, the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in 2005 allows low-cost 
generic medicines to be produced and exported under a patent compulsory licence exclusively 
for the purpose of serving the needs of LDCs when they have insufficient or no capacities in 
manufacturing pharmaceutical products. This new flexibility provided by TRIPS,26 also known 
as the “Paragraph 6 System”, extends the remit of compulsory licencing for use beyond the 
domestic market, and Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement came into effect on 23 January 
2017.27 The amendment was accepted by China in November 2007, and then ratified by the 
 
24 See China’s Proposal on WTO Reform, WT/GC/W/773, 13 May 2019 at para2.11. 
25 See Paragraph 171 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 1 October 2001, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49.   
26 When applying the principle of flexibility, national interests are accommodated and, at the same time, provisions 
and principles under the TRIPS Agreement are complied with. Flexibility, derived from the national treatment, is 
one of the principles that the TRIPS Agreement engages in order for achieving harmonised patent rights protection 
at international level with the minimum protection standards. See Hu W., International Patent Rights Protection – 
the Case of China, Routledge, 2017, at pp.56-60.   
27 WTO members on 6 December 2005 approved changes to the TRIPS Agreement in order to make permanent a 
decision on patents and public health originally adopted in 2003. This was formally built into the TRIPS Agreement 
after acceptance of the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement by two thirds of the WTO’s members. The 
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2008 Patent Law (it came into force on 1 October 2009) in which Articles 50, 53 and 57 provide 
a legal basis for China to act as an exporter of generic medicines, but with qualifications. That 
means this undertaking can only take place under “national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency” by virtue of Article 49 of the 2008 Patent Law.28 Within this context, China 
has not acted as an exporter so far, and neither, in fact, as an importer. As required, either as 
an importer or an exporter, notifications must be submitted to the TRIPS Council by the 
member concerned with precise information, such as specific imports under the instrument 
and the grant of compulsory licences for export. To date, only Rwanda submitted its notification 
as an importer, and Canada as an exporter.29    
Adopted by the General Council in November 2014, the Protocol of amendment to insert the 
TFA into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement provides the flexibilities that allow WTO developing 
members to determine when they will implement individual provisions of the Agreement. 
Developing members may equally identify provisions that they will only be able to implement 
given technical assistance and support for capacity building. China accepted the Protocol on 4 
September 2015, a year after it was adopted by the General Council. As to implementation, 
China implemented 94.5% of all the provisions by the time the Agreement entered into force 
(i.e. Category A provisions); a further 4.5% of the provisions were implemented after a 
transitional period of one year (i.e. Category B provisions). China does not have any Category C 
commitments, which means those commitments will only be implemented after a transitional 
period and with technical assistance.30 Three more provisions still require implementation and 
China has notified the TFA Council that by 22 February 2020 they will all be implemented.31 
Therefore, on the whole, China has implemented the TFA in a timely manner. The developing 
member status appears irrelevant for the country in implementing the provisions.     
In addition to the two multilateral protocols, China participated in the expanded version of the 
ITA which was concluded in 2015. The expanded ITA aims to eliminate tariffs on 201 items 
 
amendment took effect on 23 January 2017. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
amendment_e.htm (last accessed 1 October 2019). 
28 Subsequently, the definition of a pharmaceutical product is provided by Rule 73 of the Revised Rules for the 
Implementation of the Patent Law of China, and the dedicated administrative procedure is prescribed by Articles 
22 and 33 of the Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation, 15 March 2012.  
29 Available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_e.htm (last accessed 1 October 
2019). 
30 To benefit from the SDTs provided by the TFA, a member must categorise each provision of the Agreement and 
notify other WTO members of these categorisations in accordance with specific timelines outlined in the 
Agreement. There are three categories in this regard, Category A refers to those provisions that the member will 
implement by the time the Agreement enters into force (or in the case of a least-developed country member 
within one year after entry into force); Category B is for those provisions that the member will implement after a 
transitional period following the entry into force of the Agreement; Category C is for those provisions that the 
member will implement on a date after a transitional period following the entry into force of the Agreement and 
requiring the acquisition of assistance and support for capacity building. See https://www.tfafacility.org/trade-
facilitation-agreement-facility (last accessed 8 August 2019). 
31 The three provision are: establishment and publication of average release times (Article 7.6), exchange of 
information (Article 12.2) and provision of information (Article 12.6.1). See Notification of Category Commitments 
under the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, 7 August 2019, G/TFA/N/CHN/1/Add.3.  
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valued at over $1.3 trillion per year by 53 members which between them account for 
approximately 90% of world trade in the products proposed for inclusion in the expansion.32 
The expanded Agreement also contains a commitment to tackle non-tariff barriers in the IT 
sector, and to keep the list of products covered under review to determine whether further 
expansion may be needed to reflect future technological developments. The schedule of ITA 
1996 was incorporated in China’s WTO Accession Protocol.33 As a participant in the expanded 
ITA, China's expanded ITA tariff elimination schedule indicates that the first tariff cuts for the 
covered products took place on July 1, 2016, which was confirmed at the meeting of the 
country’s Trade Policy Review conducted in the same year. In this respect, China assumed 
substantial responsibilities as the country is one of the world’s largest manufacturers and 
traders of IT products.  
2.3 Other decisions on SDT  
In addition to the above, there are a few dozen SDT decisions34 adopted at ministerial and 
General Council level that came into force after China’s WTO accession, and some of them may 
be applicable to China, such as the decisions on public food stockholding for security purposes35 
and fisheries subsidies.36 It is observed that development interests regarding these two 
subjects  are also highlighted in China’s WTO reform proposal dated May 2019, as they fall 
under the SDG goals that China wishes to champion. But after a detailed check, the three 
decisions on the subject of public food stockholding are “best endeavour” type of flexibilities 
and for clarifications of existing provisions, and negotiations have been ongoing.37 There are 
two more SDT decisions concerning agricultural subsidies.  
 
32 The new accord covers new generation semi-conductors, semi-conductor manufacturing equipment, optical 
lenses, GPS navigation equipment, and medical equipment such as magnetic resonance imaging products and 
ultra-sonic scanning apparatus. 
33 See Status of Implementation, note by the Secretariat, Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in 
Information Technology Products, 10 October 2018, G/IT/1/Rev.58. 
34 For all the decisions related to SDTs, see Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and 
Decisions, Note by the Secretariat, 12 October 2018, WT/COMTD/W/239. 
35 Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes – Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013 (WT/MIN(13)/38 - 
WT/L/913), Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes – Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/939), and 
Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Country Members – Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015 
(WT/MIN/(15)/43 - WT/L/978). 
36 Fisheries Subsidies – Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017 (WT/MIN(17)/64-WT/L/1031). 
37 Presently, there are altogether three decisions on SDT concerning public food stockholding. The 2013 decision 
provide that, until a permanent solution is reached, the domestic support provided by developing members under 
their “existing” public stockholding programmes for food security purposes are protected against legal challenges 
under the AoA as long as the transparency, safeguard and anti-circumvention provisions are respected. It is noted 
in the meantime that this interim solution has not been used. The 2014 decision clarified the duration of the 
interim solution. It also put the “public stockholding” negotiations on an accelerated and separate track from the 
DDA negotiations, and the negotiations have to be pursued as a priority. As to the 2015 decision, it reaffirmed that 
the General Council Decision applicable to developing members only, and the negotiations have been ongoing 
since. 
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The Bali Ministerial Decision added the programmes to the list of general services of the AoA, 
which are related to land reform and rural livelihood security in order to address challenges of 
rural development, food security and poverty alleviation. Although such programmes38 are by 
nature domestic support, a qualified developing member may not be compelled to undertake 
the commitments of reducing such domestic support according to the obligations under Article 
6.4 of the AoA. China may implement the aforementioned programmes as “justified” non-tariff 
measures for the same purposes as dictated by the Ministerial Decision because, by virtue of 
Article 7.2 of the Accession Protocol, China pledged to eliminate and not introduce, re-
introduce or apply non-tariff measures unless they are justified under the provisions of the 
WTO Agreement. (It should be noted that this pledge is equally applicable when implementing 
Articles III and XI of GATT 1994.)  
Also, on agriculture, the ministers agreed in December 2015 that developing members should 
have the right of recourse to a special safeguard mechanism (SSM), which is a ‘safe box’ for 
bona fide food aid vis-à-vis the elimination of export subsidisation, as envisaged under 
Paragraph 7 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. The negotiations are ongoing. On the 
other hand, as to the Ministerial Decision on eliminating export subsidies entitlements by the 
end of 2018,39 three members had since done so. But in China’s case, the country pledged not 
to maintain, neither to introduce, agricultural subsidies, in accordance with Article 12 of its 
Accession Protocol.     
There are also three ministerial decisions on SDTs that reiterate members’ commitment to 
implement existing obligations of notification and transparency with respect to 1) Article 25.3 
of the ASCM on fisheries subsidies; 2) regional trade agreements (RTAs); and 3) preferential 
trade arrangements (PTAs). For RTAs and PTAs, under consideration of technical constraints, 
both ministerial decisions provide developing members with the flexibility of a delayed 
submission of required data from 10 to 20 weeks if the RTAs or the PTAs concerned involve 
only developing members.40 Technical support shall also be available if requested. The same 
flexibility was adopted with regard to PTAs, including technical support.41 It should be noted 
that none of the transparency mechanisms have been invoked by any developing members.  
 
38 See General Services - Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013 (WT/MIN(13)/37 - WT/L/912). Policies under 
the General Services involve expenditures (or revenue foregone) in relation to programmes which provide services 
or benefits to agriculture or the rural community. They shall not involve direct payments to producers or 
processors. See Annex 2, paragraph 2 of the AoA.     
39 See Export Competition – Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015 (WT/MIN/(15)/45 - WT/L/980)    
40 Otherwise, the ten-week timeframe applies if a RTA is between developed and developing members. RTA parties 
are required to submit to the WTO Secretariat e-data (if possible) as specified in the Annex, so that the Secretariat 
can draft the Factual Presentation of the RTA. See Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements – 
Decision of 14 December 2006 (WT/L/671).   
41 Otherwise, the ten-week timeframe applies if a RTA is between developed and developing members. RTA parties 
are required to submit to the WTO Secretariat e-data (if possible) as specified in the Annex, so that the Secretariat 
can draft the Factual Presentation of the RTA. See Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements – 
Decision of 14 December 2010 (WT/L/806).  
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2.4 Fisheries subsidies agreement negotiation 
Nonetheless, with regard to implementing Article 25.3 of the ASCM for precise reporting, and 
for negotiating the fisheries subsidies agreement at large, China has shown reservations under 
the ongoing negotiations. Note that the negotiation is conducted within the framework of the 
ASCM for clarifying and detailing the present provisions in order to 1) prohibit certain forms of 
fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and 2) eliminate subsidies 
that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU-fishing). The ministerial 
decision in December 201742 noted that members re-committed to implement existing 
notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the ASCM, which requires notifications to be 
“sufficiently specific” so that members will be able to evaluate the trade effects and to 
understand the operation of notified subsidy programmes. In this respect, China has let it be 
known that its capacity constraints as a developing country and the absence thus far of a 
comprehensive statistical system make it difficult to notify relevant measures and implement 
disciplines of overcapacity, overfishing or overfished stocks, since basic supporting data is 
missing.43 Though it is acknowledged that the subject of fisheries subsidies attracts 
considerable debate44 and that there is so far no definition of ‘fisheries subsidies’,45 while 
notification of fisheries subsidies could be a challenge even for the EU,46 the world’s largest 
fisheries market,47 China’s argument is debatable, especially against its WTO accession pledge 
of “full notification” as will be elaborated below.   
From the outset, China’s developing member status is self-declared and openly challenged. For 
example, due to its high fishing capacity rather than to its country/political entity in general, as 
seen from the latest statistics published by FAO (Box 1), the country is regarded as a developed, 
not a developing, country.48 The ensuing questions are two-fold, irrespective of whether 
China’s developing member status is recognised or challenged. First, how hard would China 
 
42 See Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017 (WT/MIN(17)/64-WT/L/1031).  
43 See Zhang X., Xu Q. & Wang J., Capacity Constraint: A Fundamental Perspective for the Development Issue at 
WTO, Journal of World Trade 53, no. 1 (2019), at p.23. 
44 See The WTO’s Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations, Analytical Note, South Centre, SC/AN/TDP/2017/5, July 2017.  
45 The FAO made an attempt to define fisheries subsidies as “government actions or inactions outside of normal 
practices that modify—by increasing or decreasing—the potential profits by the fisheries industry in the short-, 
medium- or long-term”. See Westlund L., Guide to Identifying, Assessing, and Reporting on Subsidies in the 
Fisheries Sector, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 438, FAO, Rome, 2004.  
46 For example, it is found that the EU’s data on fishing activities collected within the framework of the Control 
Regulation was not sufficiently complete and reliable. Catch data for vessels making paper-based declarations – a 
significant portion of the EU fleet – was incomplete and often incorrectly recorded, say the auditors. There were 
significant discrepancies between declared landings and subsequent records of first sale. See EU fisheries controls: 
more efforts needed, say Auditors, European Court of Auditors, Press Release, Luxembourg, 30 May 2017.   
47 See Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics, the Year Book 2017, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, Rome, 2019. 
The EU has a Common Fisheries Policy and is implemented by the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), 
for the years 2014-2020, with a total allocated amount of €6.4 billion which translates into €800 million per year.  
48 See Sumaila U. et al, Global Fisheries Subsidies, Note for the EU Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, 2013, at p.41.  
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negotiate for itself and on behalf of developing members in order to attain certain SDT 
flexibilities? Given its top fisheries production capacity in the world and leadership among the 
developing members, China’s position will undoubtedly influence the conclusion of the 
agreement. It is acknowledged that the main reason for providing fisheries SDT is to protect 
artisanal fishing activities, which are a major supplier of employment, income and food in many 
developing countries, and to reserve policy space for future development of the fisheries sector 
in developing countries.49 It is noted that China has been calling persistently for SDT flexibilities 
on fisheries subsidies for WTO developing members ever since its WTO accession.50 Second, 
even as a developing member, China must strive to meet the notification obligations prescribed 
by Article 25.3 of the ASCM. It is worth recalling that China committed at its accession to 
provide information “as specific as possible following the requirements of the questionnaire on 
subsidies as noted in Article 25 of the SCM Agreement”.51 This commitment has, nonetheless, 
not been fulfilled, as noted by the 2018 WTO Trade Policy Review. China’s subsidies 
notifications are in general delayed for years, with missing information and the notifications 
submitted do not go beyond the notified programmes, while it is known that China has 
continued to provide substantial support for, among others, fisheries. For some reason, official 
expenditure figures on these support programmes were not made available. For example, on 
domestic support for fisheries 2015-2017, the type of support that China submitted to the WTO 
only concerned transfer payments,52 while there are indications that the fuel subsidies 
provided for the world’s largest fishing fleet constitute the biggest fisheries subsidies 
programme.53 According to the FAO, sizeable national fishing subsidisation programmes are 
one factor54 that contributes to overcapacity in world fisheries. Other programmes include, 
 
49 See The WTO’s Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations, Analytical Note, South Centre, SC/AN/TDP/2017/5, July 2017.  
50 China's very first proposal as a WTO member country was submitted to the WTO in June 2002 about the matter 
of fisheries subsidies, with regard to the scope, SDT flexibilities and “non-actionable” subsidies. See Proposal from 
the People's Republic of China on Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/9, 20 June 2002. At the time of writing, China’s 
latest proposal on fisheries subsidies agreement negotiation was submitted on 4 June 2019, with regard to, among 
others, approaches for a capping and reduction, compliance, and “green box measures”, which include “beneficial 
subsidies” (i.e. fisheries management and services, fishery research and development), for meeting sustainable 
development goals and transparency for such measures, and SDT flexibilities for WTO developing members and 
China called for LDCs to be exempted from “capping and reduction”. See A Cap-based Approach to Address Certain 
Fisheries Subsidies That Contribute to Overcapacity and Overfishing, Communication from China, TN/RL/GEN/199, 
4 June 2019. 
51 See the Protocol on the Accession of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001, at para 10.1 at p.78.  
52 See Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/375, 6 June 2018, at pp.12, 69.  
53 It is also estimated that, for example, annual expenditure for fisheries subsidies was estimated at RMB 40.383 
billion (€5.24 billion) for 2013. Most of this amount – 94% – was in the form of fuel subsidies. See Mallory T.G., 
Fisheries subsidies in China: Quantitative and qualitative assessment of policy coherence and effectiveness. 
Marine Policy (68), 2016, at p.74.   
54 Other factors are, for instance, 1) resilient profitability of fishing activities, whereby technical progress and 
relative price inelasticity of demand for fish have largely compensated for diminishing yields in overfished fisheries; 
2) mobility of distant water fleets; 3) failure of fisheries management (in general) and of commonly used 
management methods (in particular) such as catch (total allowable catch), gear and spatial and temporal 
restrictions – which aim essentially at controlling fishing mortality indirectly through regulating the catching 
activities – rather than aiming to directly address the reasons why fishers are motivated to invest in excessive 
capital and capacity. See Measuring Fish Capacity, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 445. 
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based on a study published in 2013, fuel subsidies that contribute to the greatest part of the 
total subsidy (22% of the total), followed by subsidies for management (20%), ports and 
harbours (10%) and fleet modernisation (close to 10%).55 
 
Box 1. A few facts on China’s fisheries production56 
For capture fisheries, in 2017 China was the top-ranking fishing country in terms of quantity, 
with 15,373,196 tonnes, followed by Indonesia, India, the United States of America, and the 
Russian Federation. Compared to 2016, world capture fisheries in marine waters reached 80.6 
million tonnes in 2017, representing an increase of more than 3.2 million tonnes. China, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and South Africa experienced the main decreases, while Chile, India, 
Peru, Norway and Denmark the highest increases. In 2017, China was also the world’s top 
aquaculture producer (46.8 million tonnes, excluding aquatic plants and non-food products), 
followed by India (6.2 million tonnes), Indonesia (6.2 million tonnes) and Vietnam (3.8 million 
tonnes).  
Note that China has recently revised its 2012−2016 fisheries and aquaculture production 
statistics based on the results of its Third National Agriculture Census conducted in 2016. The 
overall result of this revision was a downward correction of its production (excluding aquatic 
plants) for 2016 of about 13.5% or 5.2 million tonnes, of which 7.0% (or 3.4 million tonnes) for 
aquaculture data and 10.1% (or 1.8 million tonnes) for capture fisheries. This, together with 
other changes, implied the downward adjustment of 2016 global statistics by about 2% for 
capture production and 5% for aquaculture production. China’s historical statistics for the 
period 2009−2011 were subsequently revised by the FAO in order to respect historical trends 
in annual variation of total production.  
The world fishing fleet consisted of about 4.5 million vessels in 2017, relatively stable since 
2008. China has the largest number of fishing vessels in the world, with 599,331 motorised 
vessels and 346,829 vessels propelled by oars or sails, followed by Indonesia, India, the United 
States of America, and the Russian Federation.  
In 2017, about 40.4 million people were engaged in fisheries and 19.3 million in aquaculture 
worldwide. China has reported declining employment in both sectors since 2012 and this 
impacts the global totals. 
In 2017, China was by far the main fishery exporting country, followed by Norway, Vietnam 
and India. The country was the world’s third importing country of fisheries commodities, 
behind the US and Japan in the same year. Nonetheless, the growth rate of China’s fishery 
exports has been declining in recent years from 7.2% in 2013 to 2.0% in 2017; for the same 
period, the growth rate of import has been slow-paced increasing from 0.3% to 0.4%.57 
 
 
55 See Sumaila U. et al, Global Fisheries Subsidies, Note for the EU Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, 2013, at p.41. 
56 See Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics, the Year Book 2017, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, Rome, 2019. 
57  See Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/375, 6 June 2018, at p.113. 
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To summarise the above breakdown, it shows that China’s WTO developing status was not a 
problem at its accession, nor following accession when China participated in the three 
agreements for lesser and weaker commitments.  
The situation could be different as far as the ongoing fisheries subsidies agreement negotiation 
is concerned, if at all, and then to what extent, China may be able to claim certain SDT 
flexibilities with its disputed developing member status. The types of fisheries SDTs come in 
various forms: 1) exclusion from disciplines, either unconditional or based on fulfilling certain 
requirements; 2) technical assistance and capacity building; 3) transitional arrangements, e.g. 
transitional period for implementation or; 4) peace clause protecting countries from being 
brought to dispute settlement. The strongest and most effective form of SDT is partial or 
complete exclusion from disciplines. Various proposals submitted to the WTO Negotiating 
Group on Rules suggest exemption from the disciplines for artisanal / small-scale / subsistence 
fisheries. But the challenge, to start with, has been to define ‘artisanal’ or ‘small-scale’ 
fisheries.58 China, in its latest proposal at the time of writing, dated June 2019, calls for 
appropriate and effective special and differential treatment to be accorded to developing 
country members and least developed country members, and for the latter to be exempted 
from capping and reduction for subsidies reduction.59 
As to fisheries subsidies notification, which is a component of the fisheries subsidies agreement 
negotiation, China has met with the same failure as mentioned above for other trade areas, 
such as agriculture subsidies notification. In this respect, aside from its more major 
commitments, China has yet to fulfil its obligations of notification in general. For example, the 
2018 WTO Trade Policy Review disclosed that, during the reviewing period, China's most recent 
notification on domestic support on agricultural products was submitted in 2015 and only 
covered the period 2009-10. In December 2018, China submitted domestic support 
notifications to the Committee of Agriculture for the period 2011-2016.60 Reading its accession 
pledges, China’s developing member status and its capacity constraints would not appear 
sufficient to explain the discrepancies in the country’s subsidies notification.       
3. Delayed and incomplete subsidies notifications render China’s high 
commitments redundant 
There are a number of reasons which may explain why China conceded to accept those high 
demands in order to secure WTO accession. For example, in order to obtain from America the 
status of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) so that the country would no longer be 
subject to the annual congressional approval of the US President’s waiver, the process was 
always highly unpredictable and often politicised due to PNTR’s statutory linkage with human 
 
58 See The WTO’s Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations, Analytical Note, South Centre, SC/AN/TDP/2017/5, July 2017.  
59 See A Cap-based Approach to Address Certain Fisheries Subsidies That Contribute to Overcapacity and 
Overfishing, Communication from China, TN/RL/GEN/199, 4 June 2019. 
60 See Notification, Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/N/CHN/42-G/AG/N/CHN/47. 
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rights conditions beyond freedom of emigration.61 Engaging external pressure to push forward 
domestic reforms could be another reason, as the battles between the reformists and 
conservatives within the Chinese leadership had been waged for a long time, and may be 
pertinent even now. Or, perhaps China negotiated a bad deal due to its capacity constraints,62 
given the fact that some of its high accession commitments were simply unattainable. At the 
same time, it was certainly a strategic decision for the US and the EU to bring about China’s 
WTO accession so that the huge market could be regulated under WTO rules. With its 
accession, China would lower many layers of high trade barriers and abolish policies that limited 
market access, including to the agricultural market, very important to the US. It was equally 
envisaged that, by integrating the world trading system, China would become a force of peace 
and stability, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.63 Therefore, China’s accession to the WTO 
was in the interest of many of the parties involved. 
However, high commitments will only be meaningful when they are fully implemented. There 
are examples that suggest China was probably not fully aware of all the complexity and 
technicalities involved when committing to certain WTO-plus obligations. A case in point is 
China’s commitment to establish financing of car purchases by non-banking institutions within 
one year, which was in effect an impossible commitment to deliver. It was revealed that, while 
answering a query raised at the first transitional review conducted by the WTO Committee on 
Trade in Financial Services in 2002, China told the members that there were still no regulations 
to implement this specific obligation. This was because, historically, institutions specialised in 
financing car purchases did not exist in China, neither there were any governing regulations 
covering licencing procedures, business scope, etc.; therefore the one-year period was too 
short for China to draft all necessary legislation, let alone to enforce it. The process of drafting 
was further delayed because some related administrative rules also required amendment, in 
order to maintain consistency. Finally, given the requirement of transparency in the drafting 
process, consultations took place between the relevant administrative agencies and interested 
parties, including the embassies of some members in China and some multinational automobile 
corporations. After the initial round of consultation, further amendments were made that 
required further comments and, therefore, further delays in legislation occurred.64  
Nonetheless, the initial impediments to compliance that confronted China were understood by 
members overall. As to implementation of its commitments per se, major contention did not 
emerge. Some members raised concerns in specific areas, such as the agricultural and financial 
 
61 Due to the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. It intended to affect US trade relations 
with non-market economies that restrict freedom of emigration and other human rights. 
62 See Zhang X., Xu Q. & Wang J., Capacity Constraint: A Fundamental Perspective for the Development Issue at 
WTO, Journal of World Trade 53, no. 1 (2019), at p.6.  
63 See Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, on Accession of China 
to the WTO, hearing before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 3 May 2000. 
64 See Report of the Meeting Held on 21 October 2002, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Committee on Trade in 
Financial Services, S/FIN/M/37, 24 October 2002, at pp.5-8. 
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sectors65 or intellectual property rights protection, which were related to delays in 
implementation, or to transparency of the legal framework and enforcement issues.66 In 
general, China’s efforts in compliance were acknowledged. A widely-shared assessment among 
WTO members was that the problems encountered primarily reflected technical difficulties, 
not a broad pattern of non-compliance.  
It must be highlighted that, in the run-up to China’s WTO accession, the US, the EU (and some 
of its member states) and a number of other countries, such as Canada, launched their 
respective technical assistance programmes to support China’s wide-ranging economic and 
societal reforms, especially with regard to applying new market-driven trade legislation, rules 
and policies. In the case of the EU, for example, its assistance programmes focused on a wide 
range of subjects, such as agriculture, legal cooperation and public administration training, 
village governance and human rights protection.67 In 2000, the amount allocated to conducting 
the bilateral EU-China cooperation projects already totalled around €60 million per year. 
In the same breath, it was also commonly agreed at the time that though implementation was 
seen as taking place following accession, compliance would be continually tested in the years 
ahead, especially with regard to compliance at the provincial and municipal levels, where 
administrative and judicial capacity constraints, and vested interests would likely hamper 
progress in, for example, eliminating restrictive practices such as the pervasive inter-provincial 
 
65 With regard to trade in financial services, the concerns raised during the initial reviews were related to, for 
example, transparency of governing regulations (e.g. national treatment for internal branching), and banking 
services (e.g. the minimum registered capital requirement or operational capital requirement for foreign-invested 
banks, financing of car purchases, requirement of the qualification of the lead partner in a new Sino-foreign fund 
management joint venture company, MFN regarding the licensing of A Share trading). Additionally, there were the 
issues of written submission and delays in implementing certain commitments. See Report of the Meeting Held 
on 21 October 2002, Note by the Secretariat, WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services, S/FIN/M/37, 24 
October 2002, at pp.2-13 
66 Other concerns raised were related to the reporting procedure. For example, the US was disappointed not to 
have received China’s responses in writing to the questions previously posed, and prior to the Committee of 
Agriculture meeting, which was an obligation under China’s Protocol of Accession. See Transitional Review under 
Paragraph 18 of the Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China, in the Summary Report of the Meeting 
Held on 26 September 2002, WTO Committee on Agriculture, G/AG/R/32, 6 November 2002, at pp.9-15.  
67 See the Joint Statement of the 3rd EU-China Summit, Beijing, 23 October 2000. Note that on 19 May in the same 
year, the EU and China concluded their bilateral agreement on China’s WTO accession on 19 May 2000. Moreover, 
according to the Joint Statement of the 2nd EU-China Summit, Beijing, 21 December 1999, the EU and China have 
conducted extensive cooperation with each other in many projects such as environmental protection, agriculture, 
the training of simultaneous interpretation, China-Europe International Business School, intellectual property 
rights, involving science, technology, finance, industry, education, development aid and others. The EU also 
offered an aid package to assist China in establishing a sound financial system. This very rich programme of 
bilateral cooperation has eventually evolved to become known nowadays as the EU-China Dialogue Architecture 
which consists of around 68 dialogues encompassing the pillars of political, economic and sectoral and people-to-
people dialogues. Thanks to the dialogues and their many concrete project deliverables, the EU-China 
comprehensive strategic partnership is able to achieve mutual benefits, address frictions and identify synergies 
for closer cooperation.    
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taxes, fees and other non-tariff obstacles.68 These concerns, regrettably, were reflected in 
reality and notification is an area that has been badly affected.  
As mentioned above, China’s notification on agricultural domestic support was seriously 
delayed. In fact, annual notification should be submitted no later than 30 June, in accordance 
with Article 25 of the ASCM. Besides that, there are also issues about incomplete submission 
as mentioned above, seen from the 2018 Trade Policy Review as reported by the WTO 
Secretariat. Notably, the Secretariat further pointed out that among the notifications 
submitted, “some notifications including those on state-trading enterprises, domestic support, 
and subsidies provided by the central government remain pending”.69 This is in marked contrast 
to China’s accession commitments. 
At the time of accession, China committed to notify any subsidy programmes, as determined, 
at all levels of government, in law or in fact, within the meaning of Article 1 of the ASCM with 
regard to subsidy. China also committed that the information provided in notification should 
be as specific as possible as prescribed by Article 25 of the ASCM. Equally, China informed the 
members that it would progressively work towards a full notification of subsidies, as 
contemplated by Article 25 of the ASCM and Annexes 5A and 5B of its Accession Protocol. It 
should be noted that “full notification” referred to the subsidies programmes that were beyond 
the scope of Annexes 5A and 5B of China’s Accession Protocol, as written in the Working Party’s 
Report which is a component of China’s WTO accession package. Examples of such subsidies 
included state support through the banking system, notably by government-owned banks, in 
the form of policy loans, the automatic roll-over of unpaid principal and interest, forgiven 
non-performing loans, and the selective use of below-market interest rates. Some members 
also referred to unreported tax subsidies, investment subsidies and subsidies provided by 
sub-national governments, some of which favoured exporting firms. Other members 
mentioned subsidies granted to the telecommunications, footwear, coal and shipbuilding 
sectors.70 China has not fulfilled the obligation of “full notification” as noted by the 2018 Trade 
Policy Review, which is also evidenced concerning its fisheries subsidies.  
In fact, in recent years, those specific examples given in the context of “full notification” of 
subsidies, as mentioned above, have grown to become focuses of contention between China 
and its major trading partners. Coupled with delayed and incomplete notifications, and the 
uncertainty of the definition of a state-owned enterprise and, consequently, of a public body, 
the specificity of a subsidy is even harder to determine for the purpose of Article 2 of the ASCM. 
Specificity is essential to establish a prohibited or an actionable subsidy, so that members could 
 
68 See Rumbaugh T. and Blancher N., China: International Trade and WTO Accession, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/04/36, at pp. 9-10.  
69 See Paragraph 2.21, Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/375, 6 June 2018. 
70 Additionally, China was required to notify under the transitional review mechanism, taking place every year in 
the first eight years of its accession, fiscal and other transfers between or among the among SOEs in the 
agricultural sector whether national or sub-national and enterprises that operate as state trading enterprises in 
the agricultural sector. See Paragraph 173 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 1 October 
2001, WT/ACC/CHN/49.   
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seek redress either by going to the DSB or by imposing countervailing measures. In the absence 
of due notifications, the functioning of the ASCM will be reduced, and foreign businesses 
adversely affected by unfair advantages from the beneficiaries of such subsidies will be left 
without recourse. The market order safeguarded by the ASCM will thus be distorted.   
Especially within this context, it came as no surprise that there have been calls for enhanced 
discipline in subsidy notification. The European Commission’s DG Trade has identified a number 
of options to advance this course, including that of installing a general rebuttable presumption 
procedure according to which all non-notified subsidies would be presumed to be actionable.71 
Submitted to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods in June 2019, the US proposed to enhance 
notification obligations by introducing a number of punitive administrative measures for when 
notification obligations are not met. This initiative is intended to apply to 14 agreements and 
decisions72 overseen by the 12 committees under the Goods Council. The US proposal may 
equally be seen as an initiative of the Trilateral Cooperation. With the aim of eliminating 
market-distorting and protectionist practices73 undertaken by third countries, since its 
inception in December 2017, one of the measures proposed by the Trilateral trade ministers 
for addressing distorting market practices is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
WTO monitoring function, including strengthening notification requirements.  
Nonetheless, doubts remain as to the effectiveness of these initiatives, especially if China’s 
participation is missing. 
4. The way forward for an enhanced subsidy notification obligation 
To install a general rebuttable presumption procedure as proposed by DG Trade, an 
amendment of Article 25.7 of the ASCM is required because the present provision holds 
notification of a subsidy measure without prejudice. But in the light of a possible “rebuttable 
presumption”, a subsidy which is not notified would be presumed actionable for causing serious 
prejudice to other members within the meaning of Article 6 of the ASCM. Consequently, in 
order to quash the presumption, the subsidising member must establish that no causal link 
exists between the subsidy concerned and the serious prejudice caused. Though the 
Commission believes that this solution would not alter the extent of subsidies notifications for 
the subsidising member yet create a strong incentive for complying with existing obligations 
under the ASCM, the whole process of negotiations would most certainly be very long and could 
 
71 See Improving Disciplines on Subsidies Notification, TN/RL/GEN/188, 30 May 2017. 
72 See Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements, 
JOB/GC/204/Rev.2, JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2, 27 June 2019. This proposal is co-sponsored by Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, New Zealand and Chinese Taipei.  
The specific trade subjects of the agreements and decision are in relation to agriculture, market access, subsidies, 
anti-dumping measures, safeguards, state trading, import licensing, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, etc. 
73 Such practices include government-financed and supported capacity expansion, unfair competitive conditions 
caused by large market-distorting subsidies and state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and local 
content requirements and preferences. 
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even fall into prolonged paralysis. The same fate would likely be met by the American proposal 
submitted at the Goods Council as mentioned above. Already, probably as a counter proposal, 
a number of members have called for an “inclusive approach” to transparency on the grounds 
of developing members’ constrained capacity in fulfilling their notification obligations. On the 
other hand, together with like-minded members, the Trilateral Cooperation may opt for a 
plurilateral arrangement so that the objective could be reached more swiftly. However, China’s 
participation in this initiative to submit itself to, and to abide by, strengthened discipline on 
notification would be key for success.  
Of course, members may use national legislation for trade remedy purposes. As prescribed by 
its bilateral WTO agreement concluded with China, America may continue to use the full range 
of its trade laws, including Section 301, Special 301 and countervailing duty and anti-dumping 
laws against China to address a wide variety of unfair acts, policies, and practices.74 But national 
recourse would only be legitimate if it is undertaken in consistency with relevant WTO rules. In 
the case of the ASCM, the imposition of a countervailing duty must be in accordance with the 
provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of the ASCM.75 As illustrated by the case 
United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (DS437), the US 
Department of Commerce was found to have acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the 
ASCM in respect of 1) the grounds upon which to determine “public body” (i.e. majority owned 
or otherwise controlled by the Government of China); 2) the approach of “rebuttable 
presumption” in determining whether a state-owned enterprise is a “public body”.76 Therefore, 
engaging China looks unavoidable when aiming for a swifter enhancement of the notification 
obligation. 
Conclusion 
It has long been acknowledged that a development divide exists between WTO members and, 
at the same time, the priorities of developing and developed members differ. To achieve the 
purpose of development for all, the WTO provides as a matter of principle greater flexibility 
and special privileges, including transition periods, to developing members, in order for them 
to adjust to the often unfamiliar and challenging WTO provisions. With necessary technical 
assistance, this arrangement comes with obligations so that eventually a developing member 
 
74 This should include 1) trade agreement violations; 2) acts, policies or practices that are unjustifiable (defined as 
those that are inconsistent with US international legal rights) and that burden or restrict US Commerce; and 3) 
acts, policies or practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict US Commerce. See 
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)-(b). 
75 See Article 10 of the ASCM. The provision further prescribes that Countervailing duties may only be imposed 
pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the ASCM and the 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
76 On other issues, the US Department of Commerce was found acted in consistency with the relevant provisions 
of the ASCM. This includes, benefit benchmark, specificity, “facts available” and export restraints. See United 
States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (DS437). Available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds437_e.htm (last accessed 3 October 2019). 
CHINA AS A WTO DEVELOPING MEMBER, IS IT A PROBLEM? | 21 
 
will be fully integrated into the rules-based multilateral trading system by conducting 
international trade on the same level.  
This paper lays out the fact that the extent and the depth of enjoyment of SDTs by WTO 
developing members are not determined by the self-claimed developing status per se, rather 
by such members’ respective accession negotiations. In the first place, the SDT provisions are 
bound by specific obligations, often in the forms of time limits and thresholds. The WTO trade 
policy review mechanism further scrutinises a member’s questionable trade policies and 
practices. The dispute settlement mechanism provides the last resort for rectifying a 
developing member’s possible breach of SDTs obligations. Therefore, the application of the 
SDTs is specific and restricted.  
There are also cases where a member declared developing status but without claiming the SDT 
flexibilities provided, as in the case of Singapore. For China, it has been persistent in claiming 
the developing status in the process of WTO accession negotiations, but the claim was quashed 
while full consideration was given to the country’s economic characteristics and its market size. 
As a result, many WTO-plus obligations were concluded at the bilateral negotiations, and then 
incorporated into China’s WTO accession package. A number of SDTs that China opted into 
have very limited significance when enforcing its accession commitments because these SDTs 
concern procedures, rather than lesser or weaker commitments. Therefore, the developing 
status was irrelevant, and not a problem, to China at its accession. After China acceded to the 
WTO, for the two protocols and one plurilateral agreement in which it participated, as 
explained above, there exists little evidence to show that China took advantage of its 
developing member status for delayed implementation or for lesser or weaker commitments. 
Nevertheless, the situation may be different for the ongoing fisheries subsidies agreement 
negotiation, as China’s claim of developing member status has met challenges, and the country 
is regarded as a developed member due to its high fishing capacity. In the same context, 
regarding precise fisheries subsidies notification within the meaning of Article 25.3 of the 
ASCM, China has let its capacity constraints be known, and there have been evident 
discrepancies between its subsidies notifications in general and its accession pledges, such as 
on agricultural subsidies. Therefore, China’s enjoyment of SDT flexibilities provides a mixed 
picture.  
On the other hand, China’s WTO developing member status claim may be understood as a 
result of political positioning to accomplish its aspiration for solidarity with developing 
members, which has always been cherished by China as its diplomatic foundation. In the same 
context, and moreover, instead of being a follower of existing trade rules dictated by the 
developed members, China will most certainly wish to carve out a multilateral trade policy 
space for itself and on behalf of developing countries in order to promote mutual development 
to “further expand South-South cooperation”. This is a strategic priority for China’s diplomacy.77 
 
77 See Ning S., China’s Relations with Developing Countries: Building Consensus on Development and Leading 
South-South Cooperation, in The CIIS Blue Book on International Situation and China’s Foreign Affairs, 2019, by 
China Institute of International Studies, at p.374. 
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It is therefore doubtful if the country would ever change this positioning, and admit to being a 
developed member, which is, in effect, less relevant to the progress of its economic 
development, but rather political. This positioning will certainly influence the fisheries subsidies 
agreement negotiation, as many big fishing nations are developing countries, such as Indonesia 
and India.    
In any case, aside from the developing member status, what really matters is compliance. In 
this regard, China has not been implementing faithfully all of its pledges made at its WTO 
accession. Nearly two decades after its accession, China, a quick learner and nowadays a 
competent operator at the WTO,78 should have since acquired plenty of capacity and 
confidence to fully comply with its obligations. Actions to achieve this objective would be a 
constructive step for forging more reliable relations between China and its major trading 
partners, for which China has made a gesture in this direction by submitting, though belatedly, 
the missing agricultural domestic support notifications in December 2018. “Full notification” 
should follow. After all, due notification is not only a contractual obligation to fulfil, but also a 
way to manifest China’s ambition as a defender of the rules-based multilateral trading order.  
 
  
 
If the issue of development interest is examined against the historical background, one could appreciate that, 
since early 1960s, China has been positioning itself to be in alliance with the group of then newly independent 
developing countries in Asia and Africa, such as Myanmar, Pakistan, and Algeria, and vowed not to let a few big 
nations decide alone on international affairs in postcolonial times. This position was spoken of by China’s then 
Premier Zhou Enlai after a whirlwind tour of 13 countries in Asia and Africa during the period of December 1963 
– February 1964. See the Three Tours Led by Premier Zhou Enlai (in Chinese). Available at  
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_674919/2159_674923/t9010.shtml (last accessed 29 
September 2019). 
78 For example, China has acquainted itself with the dispute settlement procedures fairly quickly through 
participation, as a third party but of course also as a complainant and a respondent – reflecting therefore a 
“learning by doing” approach. To date, China participated in 179 cases as a third party; the case number is higher 
than America’s and India’s which stands at 156 and 162, respectively, at the time of writing. China is a claimant of 
21 cases, and a respondent of 44 cases. See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
(last accessed 20 November 2019).    
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